Sanko Harvest

We are planning a trip to dive the Sanko Harvest in the next month or so. Here are some details, there will be more to follow.

The Sinking
At 03:20 West Australian time, 14 February 1991, the Panama registered bulk carrier Sanko Harvest grounded in shoal water between Hastings Island and Hood Island, in position 34° 07.4’ South, 122° 05.1’ East, approximately 19 miles south south east of Esperance, while on passage from Tampa, USA, via Cristobal, Panama, to Esperance, West Australia, loaded with 30,791 tonnes of fertiliser. It was her Captain's first command.

No person was killed or injured as a result of the grounding but extensive bottom damage was sustained from the impact with the reef, resulting in the release of heavy bunker oil from the
double bottom fuel tanks.

From the 14 February onwards, the condition of the ship deteriorated, being in a position exposed to the prevailing weather and swell, resulting in the progressive breach of further tanks and cargo holds. On the advice of the ship’s owners the Sanko Harvest was evacuated by the crew, for their safety, at 1655 15 February. The ship broke into three sections and sank during the night of 17/18 February.

The Sequence of Events
The Sanko Harvest loaded 21,993 tonnes of di-ammonium phosphate and 8,798 tonnes of triple strength super phosphate in bulk, in the port of Tampa.

The ship sailed from Tampa on 8 January 1991, via the Panama Canal, for three Australian ports, Esperance, Kwinana and Geraldton. The ship arrived in Cristobal, at the eastern end of the Panama Canal in the evening of 12 January and took on 1154 tonnes of heavy bunker C oil. The total quantity of bunker fuel on board sailing Cristobal was 48.23 tonnes of bunker A diesel oil and 1290 tonnes of bunker C.

The Sanko Harvest cleared the Panama Canal at 23:20 (UTC+5) 13 January. The distance to Esperance was approximate 9,300 miles with an estimated time of arrival as the morning of 13 February. The voyage to Australia was uneventful. The officers kept the traditional 3 watch system, with the Second Officer keeping the 12 to 4.

The Second Officer was responsible for navigation planning. Before departing from Cristobal he submitted the courses, distances and times for the Master’s approval. The Master also stated that he consulted the Volume 1 of the Australian Pilot. Shortly after leaving Cristobal all courses were laid off on the appropriate charts. These charts were checked for outstanding corrections against the British Admiralty Notices to Mariners held on board, which were complete to number 47 issued on 1 December 1990, the most recent notices having been received in Tampa. The Second Officer noted that, amongst other corrections, the last small correction shown on chart Aus 119, 'Approaches to Esperance', was Aus 543 of 1986.

He apparently entered 10 corrections to bring the chart up-to-date, covering the period from January 1987 to 1 December 1990, and recorded the corrections at the bottom left hand corner in accordance with accepted practice. He also recorded the corrections in a separate record of chart corrections.

The voyage followed a route through Cook Strait, New Zealand, via Bank Strait in the southern part of Bass Strait, south of King Island and thence 290° to a position 34° 22’ South, 122° 17’ East, off Twin Rocks approximately 35 miles south south east of Esperance.

On 2 February with the ship’s noon position at 41° 58’ South 174° 30’ East, the estimated time of arrival Esperance was calculated as 1000 13 February 1991. On 5 and 6 February telexes from Sanko Tokyo, confirming the program based on arrival on 13 February, were received by the ship. On 8 February the Master notified the company of an amended estimated time of arrival of 2000 local time 13 February. The following day, with 1,315 miles to run from the noon position, this was further amended to the early hours of 14 February.

On 10 and 11 February the Sanko Harvest experienced a reduction in average speed, due to head winds which put back the estimated time of arrival to later in the morning of 14 February. On 12 February the Master received two messages, one from Sanko Sydney, the other from the local agents in Esperance, asking the Master to endeavour to arrive in time to commence discharge at 0800. This required arrival at the pilot station not later than 0600.

At noon on 13 February the vessel was in position 35° 17’ South, 125° 27’ East with 209 miles to run on the planned route to Esperance. Fuel oil bunkers recorded as being on board at the time consisted of 39.7 tonnes of light diesel and 676.57 tonnes of bunker C. The course of 290° was maintained into the Second Officer’s watch.

At midnight the wind and sea conditions were recorded in the log book as south westerly force five (17-21 knots) with overcast sky and 10 miles visibility. At 0130, with 38.3 miles, to run the Second Officer altered course to 3280 and the planned passage through the Recherche archipelago commenced, utilising radar distance and bearings.

The Master stated that he went to bed at 2200 on 13 February, leaving instructions that he was to be called at a position marked on the chart 4.5 miles west of Mondrain Island. He was called at the prescribed position shortly before 0300 14 February. He arrived on the bridge shortly after, feeling no undue tiredness or fatigue. The ship proceeded at a reduced speed of 10.5 knots to make the pilot ground at 0530.

At 0307 the course was altered to 332° to pass between Hastings and Hood Island. The Master went to the radio room to send a telex to the Harbour Master, Esperance, confirming the ships time of arrival at the pilot ground. As he returned to the bridge the ship grounded in position 34° 07.4’ South, 122° 05.1’ East, apparently in shoal water not shown on the ship’s chart.

The Master sounded the general alarm and mustered the crew. The ship’s tanks were sounded and flooding into the forepeak tank, and numbers 1, 2 port ,3 port and 4 port double bottom water ballast tanks was found. The ship was seen to be leaking oil from forward and the crew deployed the limited amount of absorbent material contained on board. The escape of oil also suggested that 3 and possibly 4 port double bottom fuel tanks had also been breached. Captain Kim then telexed his owners and informed them of the grounding.

The vessel grounded on a falling tide, approximately 5.5 hours after predicted high water Esperance and 2.5 hours before the predicted low water at 0600. The ship was traveling on a course of 332° at about 10.5 knots. When the vessel brought up on the reef the heading altered to 343°. The draught at the time of the incident was approximately 10.059 forward and 10.409 metres aft. Based on a daily fuel oil consumption of 20 tonnes per day, there was approximately 36 tonnes of diesel oil, 664 tonnes of fuel oil (with approximately 500 tonnes distributed between numbers 3, 4 and 5 double bottom fuel tanks), 38 tonnes of lubricating oil and a small quantity of hydraulic oil remaining onboard.

At 0520 the ship slewed around to starboard and brought upon a heading of 050°, with a 5° list to port. At 0530 Captain Ian Harrod, Harbour Master, Esperance arrived at the Port authority offices and noted the telex from the Sanko Harvest sent at 0320. Shortly afterwards he received a VHF radio message from the ship informing him that the ship was aground and was leaking oil. The ship’s position was approximately 19 miles south south east of Esperance.

Captain Harrod informed the Federal Sea Safety Centre, Canberra of the incident, following the procedures of the National Plan to Combat Pollution of the Sea by Oil. Captain Harrod arranged for the Esperance Harbour’s oil boom to be loaded on to the harbour tug and then proceeded to the casualty, shortly after 0600.

Captain Harrod arrived on board the Sanko Harvest at 0800. He examined the ship’s chart in use at the time (AUS 119) and observed that the last small correction noted in the bottom left hand corner was Aus 500. He stated that he told Captain Kim that the chart in use was not the latest edition. The ship’s staff then referred to the notices to mariners on board and found Aus notice 577 notifying mariners that a new edition of the chart would be published shortly.

Captain Harrod also stated that there was no suggestion that alcohol or drugs were a factor in the grounding. United Salvage Pty Ltd of Sydney responded to the incident at 0930 14 February and a salvage team was dispatched to Esperance. The Salvage master arrived in Esperance at 1930 and after a meeting with local port administrators was taken to the ship by launch, where he arrived shortly after 2245.

The condition of the ship continued to deteriorate, by noon on 14 February a further five tanks were confirmed to be breached with number 3 port and number 4 port and starboard double bottom fuel tanks flooded and loosing oil to the sea. By the time the Salvage Master arrived a further three tanks had been breached and were flooded including 3 starboard double bottom fuel tank.

Arrangements were made by United Salvage for a Fremantle tug to be placed on stand-by ready for dispatch to Esperance and for pumps, compressors and other equipment to be made available.

During the early hours of 15 February water was detected in the bilges of numbers 2 and 4 holds and by 0650 both holds were flooded and cargo was being lost.

On the morning of the 15 February an underwater inspection was made of the hull. A great deal of buoyancy had been lost and the ship was effectively being prevented from sinking by the reef on which it had grounded. There was serious doubt as to whether it would be possible to refloat the ship, particularly in view of the worsening sea condition.

United Salvage, through its Sydney office notified the ship’s owners at 1308:

“Technically, the vessel was in a sunk condition yesterday with the loss of 4,900 T of ballast tank buoyancy and was only held up by contact with the reef on the port side. . . . . , we believe it is only a matter of time before there is a further failure of the hull....."

The decision to order the tug to sail from Fremantle and bring in salvage equipment was deferred until further appraisals were made by the salvors and ship’s owners.

At 1400 the Esperance harbour tug arrived at the vessel with an additional (more substantial) oil pollution boom, dispersant and spray equipment. The Master gave instructions for the ship’s lifeboats to be swung out and made ready in case of emergency.

By mid afternoon 15 February, it was apparent that the ship was seriously stressed and shortly after 1500 Captain Kim received a telex from the owners advising him to evacuate the ship before sunset. Arrangements were made through the Harbour Master for two local vessels to evacuate the crew to Esperance. All crew and salvage personnel had left the ship by 1655 hours.

Over 16 February the salvage crew attended the vessel and reported on the deteriorating situation. Aerial inspections were made of the oil pollution threat by Captain Harrod, as on scene co-ordinator, and others of the oil spill response team. Spraying with dispersant was conducted by the Esperance Harbour tug and by helicopter.

During the evening of 17 February a heavy swell developed, estimated to be between 3.5 and 4 metres. During the night, believed to be in the early hours of 18 February, the ship broke up and sank.

Inquiry Conclusions
An Inquiry concluded that the grounding of the Sanko Harvest was caused by:

1. The lack of appreciation by the Master and Second Officer (and other officers who were aware of the planned approach to Esperance) of the warnings contained on the charts and Australian Sailing Directions, Volume 1;
   
2. The failure of the Second Officer to properly apply the available corrections to the charts of the area, in particular his failure to enter small correction Aus 2 19 of Admiralty Notices to Mariners, weekly edition 20 of 21 May 1988, which described the geographical location of the shoal water upon which the Sanko Harvest grounded;
   
3. The Master’s decision to navigate in an area where acceptable hydrographic surveys were either incomplete or had not been undertaken;

Further:

The ship had on board the appropriate charts, notices to mariners and other publications to allow safe navigation;

• Had the charts held on board, particularly Aus 119, BA 3189 and BA 1059, been properly corrected, they would have provided proper and reliable navigational information;
  
• The 1990 edition of chart Aus 119 was not available to the Master and hence the outcome of the voyage had the ship been in possession of this edition is not an issue;
  
• The grounding was caused by human failure alone. Neither the cargo, nor the mechanical equipment, nor navigational equipment contributed to the incident;
  
• Neither the Master nor the Second Officer were in any way under the influence of drugs or alcohol;
  
• There is no evidence that fatigue was a contributing factor.

Source: Maritime Safety Investigation Report - Final Photos: courtesy of Esperance Diving & Fishing

The Wreck

We are in the process of researching the wreck site in preparation for the trip. More details to follow, but as usual we have built a 3D model of the ship from the available plans to help plan the objectives of the dives.